…“the groom did not respond to our request for comment.” It makes it clear that you tried and he was not interested in explaining himself.
For context, it’s standard practice in proceedings under the Family Law Act to use pseudonyms, so it’s not really possible to track this guy down and ask for his comment.
It must not be overlooked that I am not required to accept evidence, even uncontroverted evidence, if that evidence is contrary to the way events are likely to have occurred
Tell that to the High Court in Pell…
My reading of the Pell appeal was that is more or less what the High Court decided, albeit while applying the more stringent criminal burden of beyond reasonable doubt in relation to a jury trial. The Court fundamentally concluded that while the complainant’s evidence was credible, the compounding effect of unchallenged evidence from multiple other witnesses meant that there was “a significant possibility” Pell was not guilty of the charges.
I should mention that I’m not a Pell apologist; it does appear from the Royal Commission on institutional abuse that he was complicit in covering up historical sexual assaults, and that is unforgivable. But for anyone that hasn’t read the full text of the appeal (http://www7.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2020/12.html), I thoroughly recommend it. I am not ashamed to say that I think the Court makes a convincing case for him not being guilty of those particular charges.
it’s standard practice in proceedings under the Family Law Act to use pseudonyms
Oh interesting. I saw that they had referred to a lot of elements in this text by obvious pseudonyms, like “suburb B”, but then saw that both the applicant and respondent were given real-looking names. So I had assumed that they were real.
Still, in that case, “the groom could not be reached for comment” would be appropriate.
the compounding effect of unchallenged evidence from multiple other witnesses
That’s the thing though. The judge in this case said the finder of fact (in this case, himself, in the Pell case, that would be the jury) can decide for themselves whether to accept evidence, even if unchallenged, based on their own opinion of whether it was likely based on all the evidence presented.
In Pell, the jury decided, beyond all reasonable doubt, that Pell’s testimony must have been wrong. Not an unreasonable conclusion, given how bad memories are over that long period of time, and given the strong incentive Pell would have had to either lie or conveniently misremember. But the high court decided that the convention of the triers of fact not being able to be overturned on their factual findings was irrelevant.
For context, it’s standard practice in proceedings under the Family Law Act to use pseudonyms, so it’s not really possible to track this guy down and ask for his comment.
My reading of the Pell appeal was that is more or less what the High Court decided, albeit while applying the more stringent criminal burden of beyond reasonable doubt in relation to a jury trial. The Court fundamentally concluded that while the complainant’s evidence was credible, the compounding effect of unchallenged evidence from multiple other witnesses meant that there was “a significant possibility” Pell was not guilty of the charges.
I should mention that I’m not a Pell apologist; it does appear from the Royal Commission on institutional abuse that he was complicit in covering up historical sexual assaults, and that is unforgivable. But for anyone that hasn’t read the full text of the appeal (http://www7.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2020/12.html), I thoroughly recommend it. I am not ashamed to say that I think the Court makes a convincing case for him not being guilty of those particular charges.
Oh interesting. I saw that they had referred to a lot of elements in this text by obvious pseudonyms, like “suburb B”, but then saw that both the applicant and respondent were given real-looking names. So I had assumed that they were real.
Still, in that case, “the groom could not be reached for comment” would be appropriate.
That’s the thing though. The judge in this case said the finder of fact (in this case, himself, in the Pell case, that would be the jury) can decide for themselves whether to accept evidence, even if unchallenged, based on their own opinion of whether it was likely based on all the evidence presented.
In Pell, the jury decided, beyond all reasonable doubt, that Pell’s testimony must have been wrong. Not an unreasonable conclusion, given how bad memories are over that long period of time, and given the strong incentive Pell would have had to either lie or conveniently misremember. But the high court decided that the convention of the triers of fact not being able to be overturned on their factual findings was irrelevant.