• JakenVeina@lemm.ee
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    7 months ago

    The TPM stores the private key and doesn’t hand it out to anyone, not even the browser. Malware can no longer “exfiltrate” the whole session. I.E. if a piece of malware manages to compromise a cookie, it can send it off-device, where it can be freely used to impersonate the user. With the TPM involved, any impersonation of the user has to be done locally on the same device, which is theoretically more difficult to do than just silently steal a cookie.

    I’m on board with you, though, in being skeptical here.

    • onlinepersona@programming.dev
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      7 months ago

      The article specifically talks about malware running on the host machine. If that is happening, how is a TPM supposed to help?

      When the browser starts a new session, it creates a new public/private key pair locally on the device, and uses the operating system to safely store the private key in a way that makes it hard to export

      Great, the browser generates a key pair and puts the private key in the TPM. So the malware sits between the browser and the TPM. How is that better? Even if the private key were generated on the TPM, what stops malware from impersonating chrome or hooking into chrome?

      I can’t help but think it’s security theatre to add another tracking mechanism behind the scenes.

      Anti Commercial-AI license