• FfaerieOxide@kbin.social
    31·
    1 year ago

    The difference is that molecules and cells don’t all disappear at once. Consciousness is brain activity, and the brain has redundancy that allows that activity to continue uninterrupted even when small parts are swapped out. When you destroy the whole thing, though, the activity stops.

    The pattern buffer serves the same function of redundancy.

    If you’re ok with the ATP that makes your brain ebbing and flowing while asserting a continuation of self, you shouldn’t theoretically mind if that change over happens all at once.
    If it’s still “you” happening all at once, then it doesn’t matter either when that once is.
    The pattern of synapse connections firing is what thinks it’s “you” and the transport duly preserves that pattern.

    Would you be okay with your child (or some other loved one) being forcibly taken away and replaced with a perfect clone? If what you’re saying is true, you should be, since according to you they’re not just a copy, they’re literally the same person.

    Thinking “Any ‘you’ 'll do” doesn’t mean I want loved ones forced to do anything. People don’t tend to be forced onto transporter pads.

    No, I wouldn’t want a loved one forcibly taken anywhere. If a loved one took a transporter trip I’d love them just the same when they got back though.

    • Sordid@beehaw.orgEnglish
      31·
      1 year ago

      The pattern buffer serves the same function of redundancy.

      No, because people are not conscious in the pattern buffer.

      The pattern of synapse connections firing is what thinks it’s “you” and the transport duly preserves that pattern.

      Yes, but consciousness is not a pattern, it’s an activity, and that activity gets interrupted. Saying that the consciousness continues is like saying that an aircraft that made a flight, landed, and then made another flight really only made one continuous flight. It’s the activity that we’re talking about, and the interruption divides that activity into two distinct instances, even though it’s the same object performing them.

      If a loved one took a transporter trip I’d love them just the same when they got back though.

      That’s not what I asked. The transporter destroys the original person, which makes it easy to pretend that the clone is that person. The point of my question is that you know that the original is still around somewhere out there. So I ask again: Would you be okay with your loved one being replaced by a perfect clone that looks and acts exactly the same, identical down to the last atom, while knowing that the original still exists elsewhere? Or would you consider that new version to be an impostor?

      • FfaerieOxide@kbin.social
        1·
        1 year ago

        No, because people are not conscious in the pattern buffer.

        I could dispute that, but I won’t as I don’t feel that even matters to my position that my consciousness is my consciousness no matter where or how it’s arranged.

        Yes, but consciousness is not a pattern, it’s an activity, and that activity gets interrupted.

        And then starts up again, indistinguishable from before and with every right to call itself “me”.

        Would you be okay with your loved one being replaced by a perfect clone that looks and acts exactly the same, identical down to the last atom, while the original remains at large elsewhere? Or would you consider that new version to be an impostor?

        I would love my child if they went on an away mission and came back via transport. I would love my children if they suddenly were twins.

        • Sordid@beehaw.orgEnglish
          2·
          1 year ago

          I could dispute that

          Yeah, well, in Strange New Worlds the doctor’s daughter isn’t even aware she’s being put through a transporter until he tells her, so… ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ (also, spoiler warning)

          starts up again, indistinguishable from before

          It is distinguishable by its history, which is known. Understanding that two things that are identical are still two different things and not the same thing seems like a very basic cognitive ability developed pretty early in childhood, and I should probably remember what the technical term for it is, I’m sure there is one. It’s also universally understood and accepted that genuine things are more valuable than their replicas, even if the replicas are so good that their lack of documented history is the only thing that distinguishes them from their genuine models. (This is why genuine antiques with known provenance are far more expensive than even perfect fakes.) As such, I find it very difficult to believe you’re arguing in good faith here.

          with every right to call itself “me”.

          Oh really? Okay, another thought experiment: Let’s say someone creates a perfect clone of you. Does that clone now have rights to your property? Is it okay if he/she sleeps with your spouse?

          I would love my children if they suddenly were twins.

          But would you be okay with your child being taken away and replaced with a duplicate? If you’re being honest, you should be. Nothing’s changed from your point of view, it’s the same person. Right?

          • FfaerieOxide@kbin.social
            2·
            1 year ago

            It is distinguishable by its history, which is known. Understanding that two things that are identical are still two different things and not the same thing seems like a very basic cognitive ability developed pretty early in childhood, and I should probably remember what the technical term for it is, I’m sure it has one. It’s also universally understood and accepted that genuine things are more valuable than their replicas, even if the replicas are so good that their lack of documented history is the only thing that distinguishes them from their genuine models.

            If you and I each have 2006’s SMASH action film Crank on DVD, we both have the film Crank. There exist more than one of those. If a person is cloned by a transporter there are two of that person, but they diverge by virtue of unique experience.

            (This is why genuine antiques with known provenance are far more expensive than even perfect fakes.) As such, I find it very difficult to believe you’ve arguing in good faith here.

            Well you can fuck yourself if it pleases. It’s one thing to disagree with me, it’s another to impugn the earnestnest with which I state my position.

            Oh really? Okay, another thought experiment: Let’s say someone creates a perfect clone of you. Does that clone now have rights to your property? Is it okay if he/she sleeps with your spouse?

            I can see an argument for the property, and if a clone slept with my spouse would be between the clone and my spouse.

            But would you be okay with your child being taken away and replaced with a duplicate? If you’re being honest, you should be. Nothing’s changed from your point of view, it’s the same person. Right?

            Irrelevant as people are not dragged away to the teleporter, Tuvix notwithstanding.

            • Sordid@beehaw.orgEnglish
              1·
              1 year ago

              If a person is cloned by a transporter there are two of that person

              Yes, thank you! Finally! That’s what I’ve been trying to explain this entire time!

              Well you can fuck yourself if it pleases.

              That’s not very nice, and it makes me sad that you resort to insults rather than more sincere arguments in the face of criticism. And just when we were getting somewhere. Oh well, have a nice day.

    • PaleRider@feddit.ukEnglish
      1·
      1 year ago

      If a loved one took a transporter trip I’d love them just the same when they got back though.

      No, you’d love a copy of them just the same…

      • FfaerieOxide@kbin.social
        1·
        1 year ago

        You could say the same of a 7 year old in relation the the baby you previously loved.

        With all the cell-division this creature before you is just a modified copy.