RCV trends: Four states ban RCV in 2025, bringing the number of states with bans to 15.
(Okay idk why it says 15 up here then later says 16, somebody on that site probably didn’t update the title text)
As of April 30, five states had banned RCV in 2025, which brought the total number of states that prohibit RCV to 16.
- Gov. Mark Gordon (Republican) signed HB 165 on March 18.
- West Virginia Gov. Patrick Morrisey (Republican) signed SB 490 the March 19.
- Kansas Gov. Laura Kelly (Democrat) signed SB 6 into law on April 1.
- North Dakota Gov. Kelly Armstrong (Republican) signed HB 1297 on April 15.
- Gov. Sarah Huckabee Sanders (Republican) signed HB 1706 which became law on April 17.
Six states banned RCV in 2024.
Why YSK: If you’re a US-American, its time to pay attention to State and Local politics instead of solely on the Federal. There is a trend in conservative jurisdictions to stop progress in making elecoral systems more fair. Use this opportunity as a rallying-cry to pass Ranked-Choice Voting in progressive jurisdictions, and hopefully everyone else takes notes. Sometimes, all you need is a few states adopting a law to become the catalyst for it to become the model for the entire country, for better or for worse. Don’t allow anti-RCV legislations to dominate, counter the propaganda with pro-RCV arguments. Time to turn the tide.
Edit: fixed formatting
Edit 2: Added in the map so you don’t have to click the link:
See the pattern? 🤔
I agree it’s a flaw, but the answer isn’t to move to an even worse and more gameable system, it’s to move to proportional systems like MMP.
Cardinal voting systems are terrible because strategic voting is as trivial as it is in FPTP. In IRV situations where strategic voting would be possible exist, but they’re rare and hard to predict. In cardinal systems it’s always best to give the maximum score or the minimum score, and never anything in between.
And when that happens it just defaults to approval, which is still non-monotonic and better than IRV, but it’s been proven anyway that that doesn’t happen and most people are honest (or would learn to be honest after few iterations). IRV is also not devoid of strategy, as it can be better to rank your true favourite lower
I think you missed the part where I said that it can happen, but that it’s rare and hard to predict.
Approval Voting is bad because of the simple fact that it doesn’t let you express any preference. There’s no ability to say “I’ll take this guy if I really have to, to avoid the worst outcome, but if possible I would much prefer this other guy”. In single-winner systems, having some mechanism to express that one candidate is better than another is absolutely crucial.
Yea, sorry, my wording wasn’t the clearest. I meant to say that it is actually not that rare, and hoped that the linked source would help support that claim. From the same website:
We can [assume that] “all votes [are] equally likely except that the probabilities that A,B,C will be middle-ranked of the three in that vote are 30%, 30%, and 40% respectively” where C is the 3rd-party candidate. Then in IRV as #voters→∞, C’s probability of winning is probably exponentially tiny so that Joe Voter is justified in assuming C only a very tiny […] chance of winning. Indeed C only has a tiny chance of merely surviving the first round.
However, Joe reasons, if Joe and friends by honestly-ranking C top do manage to make C survive the first round, then that will almost certainly happen only at the cost of eliminating Joe’s second-favorite candidate A. If the A votes then transfer equally to C and B (which in “1-dimensional politics” with C A B arranged along a “line” in that order, seems likely) then C will almost certainly still lose, and will have deprived A of victory in the process.
The idea then would be that the behavior of mid-ranking the 3rd party candidate would be self-reinforcing in IRV: an assumption of a slight bias that way like we just made (40% versus 30% […]), then leads to it being strategically wise for Joe Voter to do it, leading to a larger bias that way, etc. – positive feedback, self-reinforcing 2-party domination.
I agree and that’s why I support Score Voting over it! The mechanism to express that one candidate is better than another one is to just give them honest scores! And there’s studies proving that’s the reality is, the vast majority of people are at least somewhat honest when filling out a Score ballot
Cardinal systems devolve into approval, and approval doesn’t allow expressing preference. And being unable to express preference lends itself to some of the worst strategic voting and reintroduces the spoiler effect in the place it’s most important to avoid the spoiler effect: serious 3-(or more-)way races. If I’m an A voter, B is centrist, and C is worst, then under approval it’s fine for me to approve of A and B if I know A can’t win. But the moment A is a serious contender, choosing to approve of B decreases the chance A might win. But not approving of B increases the chance C might win. I’m stuck with having to make a terrible decision.
Ordinal systems don’t do this. Some ordinal systems might be better than IRV and avoid the biggest criticisms of that system, but ordinal systems beat cardinal systems nearly every time.
But the main thing about all of this is that every single-winner system is always worse than proportional multi-winner systems. Moving to any system other than FPTP should be the first priority, but if you’re going to spend time knocking down suggestions to improve to the most well-proven alternative, you might as well go all the way and advocate MMP or direct proportional, and on shoring up some of the weaknesses of that system (such as problems with party lists letting parties choose who gets in even if people don’t like the candidate of the party they like, or how minimum thresholds can lead to some people’s votes being effectively wasted).